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INTRODUCTION.

I

submitting the following remark to the consideration of

such persons a may take the trouble to read them, I solicit the
indulgence of a few ·words of a personal character.
When Mr. Binney'. pamphlet on the" Ilabeas Corpu "made
it appearance, I read it with the utmo ·t care and with an earne t endeavor_ to dive::-t my elf of all educational bia . Its propo ·ition were examined as quo tion

of law, and, us far a

pos ible, independently of the influence of preconceived opinions.
The re ult arrived at wa a conviction on my mind that in many
respects his premi es were not well taken, and that his inferences
or conclu ions were erroneou .
In common with many other per ons, as it now appear , I
commenced the preparation of a reYiow of his argument.
During the period ·which has since elapsed ovcrnl such article
have been published.

Tho danger of producing a

urfoit of

Ila.boa Corpus pam1)hlet" would have deterred me from adding
one more to that number but for the fact that, upon examh1ing
these publication , it appeared they all Yio-,ved tho mntter from
more or le s varying stand-points, and mine differed omewlrnt
from all of them.
I have sought to tr at the subject simply and purely in its
legal aspects.

If the following remark" .,hall in any degree aid
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in c1iminntin<r the truth, that will be ample compcn ation for the
time and labor bestowed upon them.

I a k of tho e who may

read them a candid and impartial consideraiion of the argument '
and authorities presented.

·whether they po ess any other

merit or not, thu much at least is claimed for them: they have
been attentively considered and carefully prepared.

They arc

put forth with a sincere desire to promote tho cau e of truth and
the preser'rntion of rights which I, in common with all American citizen , lu1,v-e been taught to cherish a the mo. t , acred of
those inherited from our ancestors.
Abstainino· from reflection upon ibe occurrence of the day,
my purpose has boon imply to present the grout constitutional
question in,olYed in it true light.

It i::i for the reader to deter-

mine ·1Nith what Ruccos this effort has been attended.

JOIL. T 0. TITJLLITT.
PHILADELPHIA,

March 10, 1862,

REVIEW.

Tim fir t three articles of the Constitution of the nitcd
States treat of the three departments of the Government respectively: 1. The Legislative; 2. The Executive; 3. The
Judiciary.
With a view to facilitate the discussion a to the ubject of the
Habeas Corpus, to which the following remarks are addressed,
such portions of the Constitution as are necessary for reference
will be given. They are:
ARTICLE

I.

SECTION 1. All legi lative powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist
of a enate and House of Representatives. . . . . .
SECTION 8. The Congress shall have power. .
To declare war, grant letters of marque an<l reprisal, and
make rule concerning captures on land and water.
To raise and support armies ; but no appropriation of money
to that u e shall be for a longer term than two year .
To provide and maintain a navy.
To make rules for the government and regulation of the land
and naml forces .
To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of
the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in
the service of the United States.
And to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into execution tho foregoing powers and all other power
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vested by this Constitution in the government of the U nitecl
States, or in any department or officer thereof.
SECTION 9. The migration or importation of such persons as
any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall
not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight; but a tax or duty may be imposed
on uch importation not exceeding ten dollar for each per on.
The priYilege of the ·writ of Habea Corpu shall not be suspended, unle s when, in cases of rebellion or i1rrnsion, the public
safety may require it.
No bill of attainder or ex post facto la;w shall be passed.
AMENDMENTS .

ARTICLE

III.

o soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house
without the con ent of the owner; nor m time of ·war, but in a
manner to be prescribed by law.
ARTICLE

IV.

The right of the people to be secure in their per ons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated; and no warrants shall issue. but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, ancl the persons or things
to be eizcd.
ARTICLE

V.

No person hall be held to ans-wer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,
or in the militia, when in actual ervice in time of war or public
clanger;
. nor be dep1-i-recl of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law. .
ARTICLE

VI.

In all criminal prosecutions the accu ed hall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
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district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. .
It will thus be seen that the framers of the Constitution made
Yery ample provision for enabling Congress to pa • all la·ws
which any po sible contingency arising either from foreign or
dome tic disturbances could render neces ary for the ·welfare of
the country. But it is also apparent that they guarded with
the most sedulous care the rights of the people against the
exercise of arbitrary or unregulated power.
The su ·pension of the Habea · Corpus by the Executive
department without the authority of an act of Congress has
given rise, during the last few months, to much discussion.
Among the publications upon this subject that which has perhaps attracted most attention in this community is a pamphlet
by Horace Binney, Esq., entitled, "The Privilege of the Writ
of Habeas Corpus under the Constitution." It is an elaborate
effort to show that the power of suspension belong , under the
Constitution, to the President without, and exclusive of, any
control or authority by Congress.
The subject is one of vital importance to the whole people;
and such a publication as that of Mr. Binney should not pass
down in the constitutional history of the country without comment. If founded in error, it is fraught with most serious mischief; if in _truth, discussion will only serve to bring out its
verification in bolder relief.
In construing constitutional or legislative enactments, certain
rules of interpretation have been adopted by ·which the meaning
of the framers of the instrument or law is to be ascertained.
The first of these is the plain rendering of the language used
according to the meaning of the words a understood at the time
of their adoption. If for any reason, however, there is any
ambiguity in the language, then resort must be had to other
aids in arriving at the proper construction. Among these are
the context, analogy, the object had in view by the framers
their contemporaneous expressions, legislative or judicial interpretation, the opinions of statesmen, jurists and text-writer on
the subject; and in fact everything, whether it be hi torical,
juridical or legislative, which can hed any light upon the subject.
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Applying the first rule stated above, it would seem hardly to
admit of a <loubt that the Constitution reposed in Congress alone
the power to su pend the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.
But the pamphlet under con icleration endeavors, by a process
of reasoning of extreme refinement, to e tabli h, not only a
denial of the power to Congress, but the vesting it in the
President. It is proposed to examine the grounds upon which
this doctrine re. ts.
IS THE CLAUSE A GRANT OF POWER, OR A RESTRICTION?

The first proposition of the pamphlet is, that the Habeas
Corpus clause is a grant of the power of su pension. The language used is as follows:
"The c1au e in the Constitution of the United States, in
regard to the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, is this :
"' The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
su pended, unless, when in cases of rebellion or invasion, the
public safety may require it.'
The sentence is elliptical. When the ellipsis is supplied it
read thus:
"The privilege of the Writ of Ilabcas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unle s, when in cases of rebellion or invasion, the
public safety may require it; and then it rnay be suspended.
" Thi i the necessary effect of the conjunction 'unless,'
which reve1-. e the action of the preceding verb; and it will be of
perfectly equivalent import and effect if the clause be transposed
as follow : 'The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus may
be uspencled in cases of rebellion or inva ion, when tho public
safety may require it; and it shall not be suspended in any other
case.' " (Pamphlet, p. 9. *)
This a sumes that there was no pre-existing power to suspend,
or rather, that without this clause no authority for its exercise
would have been implied from any source, and that the grant of
the power is to be found in these words only.
The Constitution provides that a thing hall not be done
exrept under certain contingencies. This would imply that the
general power was granted elsewhere, and, but for the clause of
restriction, it could have been exercised in all cases to which the
general principle would apply.
But the argument inverts the natural construction, and con-

* The references to the pamphlet of Mr. Binney are to the pages of the
edition issued by C. Sherman & Son.
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I

verts a restriction into a grant with a qualification. It is true
that thi rule may be, and sometimes is adopted by courts in
the con truction of statutes, in order to effectuate the intentions
of the Legi laturc ; but it is regarded as an artificial, rather
than a natural mode of construction. The natural construction
n,nd the con titutional one, too, would seem to be that this wa
merely a restriction or limitation of the power already e.·isting,
or conferred by some other portion of the Coni5titution upon the
department to which the re triction was applied, to wit, the
legi lative,-that in all uch case , as the privilege of the Writ
could have been suspended but for this restriction or limitation,
it may still be su pended <luring the prevalence of rebellion or
inva ion, when the public safety may require it. Yet, under
the e circumstances, it can only be done by the ame department which would have had the power if the re triction had not
been adopted.
It may be a ked, whether the power to suspend is conferred
upon Congres , ancl, if so, where the authority for it is to be
found? Does it exist imlepcndcntly of the Con titution? The
answer is that it docs not, as Congre s has no powers except
such as arc given by the Constitution.
One con. truction places it derivation under the expre s grant
of the power to Congress to regulate the courts. Thi wa the
view entertained by Governor Randolph, who was a member of
the Federal Convention that framed the Constitution, and al o of
the Virginia Convention which ratified it. In a speech in favor of
its ratification, he uses this language : "But the insertion of the
"negative restrictions bas given cau c of triumph to gentlemen.
"They suppose that it demonstrate that Congres arc to have
"powers by implication. I will meet them on that ground. I
"per uadc my elf that every exception here mentioned is an ex" ception, not from general powers, but from the particular powers
"therein vested. To what power in the GC'ncral Government
"i the exception made re pccting the importation of ncgroes ?
"Not from a general power, but from a particular power
"expre. sly enumerated. Thi i an exception from the power
"giYen them of regulating commerce. Ile ask where i the
"power to which the prohibition of u pending the Habea
"Corpus i an exception? I contend that, by virtue of the

10
"power given to Congress to regulate courts, they could sus" pend the Writ of Habeas Corpus. This is, therefore, an
"exception to that power." (Elliott's Debates, Vol. III, p. 464.)
It is to be observed, that the Constitution only confers upon
Congress the power to regulate the Federal courts. Therefore,
if the authority to suspend a Writ is dei,ived from that grant, it
must be limited in its application to those particular tribunals.
Hence, it would follow, that the power of suspension, conferred
by the Constitution, would be restricted to the privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus, as enjoyed under the jurisdiction and
practice of the Federal courts alone.
The State courts, not being subject to regulation by Congress,
would be excluded from the operation of the power of suspension. The judges of the latter, however, can issue the Writ of
Habeas Corpus with the same force and effect as those who preside in the courts of the United States. Therefore, if the views
of Governor Randolph are correct, it results that the power of
suspension granted to Congress being limited to the Writs issued
or to be issued by the Federal courts, and having no application
to the State courts, the attempt to suspend the privilege could
and probably would be rendered nugatory by the action of the
latter. Such a glaring defect cannot well be imputed to the
Constitution, and while the opinion of Governor Randolph is
entltled to as much weight as that perhaps of any one who has
ever expounded that instrument, it is contended that in this
instance he has fallen into an error as to the clause under which
the power of suspension is granted. His remarks, however,
contain two propositions which render them worthy of much
consideration in treating this subject: 1. He distinctly avers
that the Habeas Corpus clause is a restriction upon power
granted elsewhere, and is not in itself a grant of any power. 2.
He as decidedly declares that the power of suspension is vested
in Congress.
A different interpretation, and, with all due respect for the
opinions of Governor Randolph, it is suggested, as being a much
more reasonable one, is this : that the authority to suspend the
Habeas Corpus is conferred under the power to provide for the
suppression of insurrection and the repelling of invasion. This
inference is supported by English analogy. 'fhe power of sus-

,.
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pension was usually exercised under these circum tances by
Parliament. It springs from the neces ity recognized a. existing for the su8pension under these circumstance ; and finally,
the Habeas Corpus clause implies its grant under the power
referred to, by providing that it shall not be u'" pended, nnle s
when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may
require it.
The power to provide for the suppre sion of insurrection or
inva ion is gi,,en to Congress. The Constitution restricts the
authority to suspend to uch occasions, and the inference is
natural that the department charged with the duty of providing
for suppression was the one authorized to wield this power for
the purpose of attaining the proposed. end. The nece8sity for
it exercise upon such occasions renders it one of the means to
be employed, and. brings it within the provisions contemplated
by that clause. The authority to suspend is first given as a
means of suppressing insurrection or repelling invasion; and the
restriction is then put upon this authority that it shall not be
exercised even under those conditions, except when "the public
safety may require it."
"Suspension," "insurrection," "invasion," are in eparably
bound together. Con true the Constitution in this way and its
reading is simple, consistent, and natural.
If, then, it is an enor to construe the Habeas Corpus clause
as a grant of power, instead of a restriction, all the rest of the
argument which is founded upon this error must fall when it is
removed. There might be some rea, on for asserting that it was
affirmative rather than restrictive, if there was no other clau e
in the Constitution under which the grant of the power of suspension would be properly implied.
Thi interpretation places the power in the Legi lative department and in that only, and if adopted is a complete bar to any
such claim on the part of the Executive department. ,rirnther
correct or not, it is left for the reader to determine, with this
suggestion, however, that in order to understand the true meaning of any one clau. e of the Con titntion the whole mu t be
carefully examined and each part read by the light of every
other.
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THE HI TORY OF THE CLAUSE.

But the hi tory of the clau c i relie<l upon as su taining tho
view that it was intended as a grant of power to the Executive
department.
After giving that history, the pamphlet remarks: "Enougl1,
"however, is recorded to show that it must have been in the
"mind, of the delegate under at lea t three aspects: 1. Sus,, pen ·ion of the privilege, and not of the Writ or Act. 2. Sus" pension by the Legislature, and only by the Legi ·lature. 3.
" uspensiou generally, ancl by the department that would be
"intru ted in rebellion or invasion with the afety of the public."
This i most ingeniou ly put, and it is followe<l by tlie effort to
how that the department so intru ted i the Executive, a.ml
therefore the power of Sl1.,peirion falls to that department. It
is believe<l that this hi tory does not how that the delegates had
in their mind a su pen ·ion of the privilege a <l;stinct from that
of the Writ; on the contrary, that they regarued the swspension
of the privilege of the Writ a the generic term including the
suspen ion of the Writ, whether as derived from the common
law or from any legi lative act. It doc sho"';. that they contemplated it su pension by the Legislature under certain contingencies, but it in no wise countenances the idea that they contemplated conferring the power to suspend upon any other than the
Legi,_ la ti ve clepartmen t.
The Convention met in ~lay, 17 7, in Philadelphia. On the
29th of fay, Mr. Charles Pinckney, of outh Carolina, laid
before the House a clraft of a plan of a Federal Constitution,
the Ylth Article of which provided, "The Legislature of the
"United State shall pas. no law on the subject of religion, nor
"touching or abridging the liberty of the pre s; nor shall the
"privilege of the Writ of Habea Corpu ever be su pcnde<l,
' except in the case of rebellion or invasion."
On tho 6th of Augu t the Committee of Detail, con isting of
Rutledge, Randolph, Gorham, Ell worth, and Wil on, reported
a draft of a Con titution, but it contained no provision on the
ubjoct of the "\Vrit of Habeas Corpu .
On the 20th of August ~Ir. Pinckney ubmitted to the House,
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in order to be referred to the Committee of Detail, the following
proposition, among others: '~ The privileges and benefits of the
"Writ of Habeas Corpus shall be enjoyed in this Government in
" the most expeditious and ample manner, and hall not be sus" pended by the Legislature, except upon the mo t urgent and
'' pre sing occasions, and for a limited time not exceeding - " months."
On the 2 th of the same month, "l\lr. Pinckney, urging the
"propriety of securing the benefit of the Habeas Corpus in the
"most ample manner, moved that it should not be suspended
"but on the mo t urgent occasions, and then only for a limited
"time, not exceeding twelve months."
"Mr. Rutledge was for declaring· the Habeas Corpus invio" late. He did not conceive that a suspen ion could ever be
"necessary at the same time through all the States."
"Mr. Gouverneur Morris moved that the privilege of the
"Writ of Habeas Corpus should not be suspended, unless when,
"in cases of rebellion or inva ion, the public safety may
"require it."
"1\Ir. Wil on doubted whether in any case a suspension could
"be nece sary, as the di cretion now exists with judges in most
"important cases to keep in gaol, or admit to bail."
"~he first part of l\lr. Gouverneur Morris' motion, to the
"·word 'unle s,' was agree<l to n.ern. con. On the remaining part
"the vote stood: Aye-New Hamp hire, Massachu ett , Con" necticut, Pennsylvania, Dclawa,rc, Maryland and Virginia-7.
"Nay-North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia-3." (Elliott's
Debates, Vol. V, pp. 131, 376, 445, 484.)
It will be perceived, by a reference to the above, that the
delegates spoke of "the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Cor" pus," "the privilege· and benefit of the Writ of Habeas
"Corpus," and "the Habeas Corpu ," indifferently, as conveying the same general meaning.
We find in the letter of Luther Martin, one of the able t and
most enlightened lawyers of hi day, to the Speaker of the
Hou e of Delegate of Maryland, of January 27, 17 , assigning
his reasons for voting in the negative upon thi clause, that he
peak of su pending the Habea Corpus Act. Ile ay : ' By
"the next paragraph, the General Government is to have a
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"power of suspending the Habeas Corpus Act in cases of
"rebellion or invasion. As the State Governments have a
"power of suspending the Habeas Corpus Act in those cases,
"it was said there could he no reason for giving such a power
"to the General Government, since, whenever the state which
"is invaded, or in which an insurrection takes place, finds its
"safety requires it, it will make use of that power; and it was
"urged, that if we give this power to the General Government,
"it would be an engine of oppression in its hands, since, when" ever a state should oppose its views, however arbitrary and
"unconstitutional, and refuse submission to them, the General
"Government may declare it an act of rebellion; and, sus" pending the Habeas Corpus Act, may seize upon the persons
"of those advocates of freedom who have had virtue and reso" lution enough to excite the opposition, and may imprison
" them during its pleasure in the remotest parts of the Union;
"so that a citizen of Georgia might be Bastiled in the farthest
"part of New Hampshire, or a citizen of New Hampshire in
"the farthest extreme of the South-cut off from their family,
" their friends, and their every connection.
"These considerations induced me, sir, to give my negative
"also to this clause." (Elliott's Debates, Vol. I, p. 375.)
The error of Mr. Martin, in speaking of the Habeas Corpus
Act, taken in connection with the language used in the Convention, indicates clearly that the delegates had in their minds the
general proposition of the suspension of the Habeas Corpus,
and that the words, as finally used, were adopted, as expressing
most appropriately the general idea that the privilege or benefit
of the Writ should not be suspended. The words of the clause
were generic, embracing the suspension of the privilege of the
Writ, whether the Writ itself was authorized by the common
law or by legislation. This language also makes it apparent
that the delegates did not contemplate its suspension by any
other than the Legislative department.
The clause, as found in Mr. Pinckney's draft of the 29th of
May, is the latter part of a clause restricting the power of the
Legislature as to the subject of religion and the liberty of the
press, and it is but reasonable to infer that the latter part of the
sentence relates back to the first, and operates as a restriction
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upon the same department which was embraced by the preceding
restrictive provisions.
If there was any doubt about this, it is cleared up by the
language of Ir. Pinckney's proposition of the 20th of August,
which is more complete in its character, and in which he uses
the words, " shall not be suspended by the Legislature." It
may be then safely affirmed, that at that time, and up to the
28th of August, when Mr. rinckney again urged the propriety
of securing the benefit of the Habeas Corpus in the most ample
manner, the only department in which it was contemplated to
vest the power of suspension was the Legislative. This conclusion cannot be resisted, when it is remembered that the only
proposition inti:oduced up to that time expressly provided for
the su pension by the Legi 1ature only. It was upon that day
that the clause substantially as it now stands was moved by Mr.
Morris.
The clause, as moved by l\:fr. Morris, was this: "The Privi,t legc of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended,
" unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety
"may require it." Mr. Pinclmey's original proposition will be
found ante, page 12.
The only substantial change made in the provision was to
ad'1 the still further restriction, (when) "the public safety may
"require it" after the word "invasion." It will be seen that
Mr. :Morris adopted the original proposition of Mr. Pinckney,
making the above ad<lition, which is immaterial as to the subjectmatter now under discu ion, and that he contemplated the
application of the clause to the same department of the Government as was embrace<l by Mr. Pinckney's original proposition.
If not, why <lid he adopt the same language, without making
some such change as would have excluded such a conclusion?
'' But," says Mr. Binney, "no such conclusion is to be
"drawn, because the word 'Legi 1ature,' used by M:r. Pinckney
"in the beginning of his first propo ition, was stricken out by
"Mr. Morri . " It is a mistake to say it was stricken out, for it
was in Mr. Pinckney's original proposition only by relation to
the first part thereof, and the clause is now found in the Constitution under that head which treat of the Legi lative department of the Government, and immediately succeeding the
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. restriction upon tho power of Congress to prohibit tho migration
or importation of certain per ons therein referred to, just a: Mr.
Pinckney's original clause connected it with the precedent
restriction upon the Legislature as to tho freedom of conscience
and of the press, and is immediately followed by tho restriction
upon the power of Congros to enact bills of attainder or e.c post
facto laws. (See clause, ante, p. 6.) The original propo ition
of Mr. Pinckney followed, and was in the same clause with the
prohibition upon the Legislature to pass laws on tho subject of
religion, or abridging the liberty of tho press. The position of
the pre ent clause is in Article I, which treats of legi. lative
powers and legislative restrictions, and is both preceded and
followed by such restrictions. It bears the same relation to the
word "Congress," in the first clause of Section 9, Article I,
which Mr. Pinckney's clan e bore to the word "Legislature''
in his first proposition. With what show of plausibility can it
be argued that :Mr. Morris intended to abandon Mr. Pinckney's
original proposition?
But l\Ir. Binney further contends that as Mr. Morris made
the motion, and it was adopted by the Convention as an amendment to the fourth section of the XI th Article of the Constitution
as it had been reported by tho Committee of Five on the Gth of
Augu t, which was the Judiciary Article, therefore the inference
is expressly negatived that it was tho Legislative department to
which the clause was to apply. The reasons which induced Mr.
Morris to attach the clau e to the Judiciary Article, cannot now
be certainly stated. Yet a that clause provided for the trial of
crimes in the states where they were committed, and that such
trial hould be by jury, it is probable he at fir t proposed to
attach it to that section as being cognate, and in a lerral point of
view connected with it. The fourth section of tho XIth Article
referred to is sub tantially tho same as the third clause of the
second section of the Constitution as finally adopted.
A further examination of the bistory of the clause will show that
the inference referred to is not only not expressly negatived,
but, on tho contrary, is strongly supported by it. Tho Convention having discussed and adoptetl the articles and sections
·eparately and in detail, on the 8th of September, 1787, "it was
"moved and seconded to appoint a committee of five to revise
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"the style of, and arrange, the articles agreed to by the House,
"which passed in the affirmative.
"And a committee was appointed by ballot, of the Hon. Mr.
"Johnston, l\fr. Hamilton, Mr. G. Morris, Mr. Madi 'on, and
"Mr. King." (Elliott's Deb., Vol. I, p. 295.)
On the 12th of September the committee reported the Constitution as revised and arranged, placing the clause in question in
it present position, and of course taking it out of the Judiciary
Article. So it was adopted.
It is clear from this that the Committee on Style and Arrangement, in recasting the Constitution, did not deem the J mliciary
Article the proper place for the clause. It is equally clear that
they did not regard it as applicable to the Executive department,
otherwise, when finding it in the wrong place, and intending to put
it in the right one, as it was their duty to do, they would have
arranged it under Article IL, which treats of the Executive department. It is hardly to be supposed that if Mr. Morris had intended to modify Mr. Pinckncy's original proposition, o as to make
it applicable to the Executive department, instead of the Legislative, he would have moved it as an amendment to the J udiciar,.,.
Article. And it is equally difficult of belief that with this idea
prominent in his mind, as it must have been if he made the
change supposed by M:r. Binney, he would have consented to
its final arrangement un<ler the Article relating to the Legislative department, pressed back, as it would be, by relation and
by all fair rules of construction into the very position from which
he had wrested it by taking it out of the hands of l\fr. Pinckney.
But the action of the Committee on Style and Arrangement
negatives any such inference. It was their duty to rearrange
and recast the whole, in order to ma,ke its every part harmonize.
They had to exercise their judgment and discrimination as to
the proper place for each article. In doing so, they put this
clause under the Legislative head.
The argument is rendered still more conclusive by the fact
that Mr. Morris was himself one of the Committee of Five on
Style and Arrangement, and in fact placed the clause where it
is now found. He was not only one of the Committee of Five,
but he actually wrote the Constitution as reported by that committee and adopted. He says, in a letter to Timothy Pickering,
2
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of December 22d, 1814, speaking of the Constitution, "That in" trument was written by the fingers which write this letter."
· Mr. Madi on says, "The finish given to the style and arrange" ment of the Constitution fairly belongs to Mr. Morris."
(Letter to Mr. Sparks, April 8th, 1831.)
With these fact before us, it can be affirmed with the utmost
confidence, that l\Ir. Morris did not intend to abandon Mr.
Pinckney' s propo ition as to the department upon which the
restriction was imposed, but on the contrary, that he placed it
in uch a po ition, and under such circumstances, as to remove
every po. ible doubt that his purpo e was to apply it to the
Legi lature.
Upon examining the hi tory of the clause and the Constitution as it now stands, the reader will be prepared to judge of
the force of the extraordinary remark to be found on page 32
of the pamphlet, that "the present po ition of the clau e in the
" Con titution is not of the least importance."
One of the rule laid down by Black tone for interpreting the
will of the Legi lature in a case of doubt is to exa.mine the context. The bi tory of legislation may also be brought forward
in order to clear up any ambiguity in respect thereto. If there
couM be any doubt as to the true constructi~n of the clause in
question, its po ition with reference to other parts of the Constitution is neces arily a subject of con ideration. The manner in
which it wa placed in its pre ent location is also entitled to very
great weight. That excludes the po sibility of its having fallen
there by accident. It is wedged in between two clau es which
hold it fa t and control it. It is inseparably connected with the
first, and it is the link which binds the third to the first. (See
the three clauses, ante, p. 6.)
It will be perceived that as the clause immediately preceding
the one in question is a direct prohibition upon Congre , and is
the first re trictive clause, and as the clau e succeeding it is
confe. sedly ,al o a re triction upon Congress, but without again
introducing the word Congress, it necessarily relates back to the
fir. t clau e of the section and through the Habeas Corpus clause,
and thu brings down the word Congress through the Habeas
Corpus clause, and as an inseparable part of it. Otherwise it
-would have been requisite to reintroduce the word Congress
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for the proper construction of tho sentence; that is, the word
having been used in the first clau e, and dropped in the seco]J(l,
it would necessarily have been reproduced in the third. '.l'he
failure so to reproduce it proves that it was not dropped in the
second, but was implied in reference to that as well as the third.
It is probably the first time in our history that an able and
profound lawyer has graYely advanced the propo ition, that the
present position of any clause in the Constitution "is not of the
" least importance."
However the fact may be as to any other, certainly such an
assertion as to the Habeas Corpus clau e by one whose reputation for learning and acumen in his profe'"'sion was at all questionnible, would argue a degree of boldne s bordering very closely
upon temerity.
It involves the reflection upon the framers of that instrument
of their having been so reckle s as to the effect of their ,rnrk,
and so faithless to the trust confided to them, that they pitched
this most important safeguard to the liberties of the people
hap-hazard into the Constitution without caring where it chanced
to fall.
Fortunately the history of the manner in which it reached its
present position, repels any uch imputation. It shows that
they had an intelligent understanding of what they were doing,
and that they executed their purpo e in the way rnof!t concluci,Te
to the protection and preservation of tho liberties of the people.
That purpose was to place the restriction upon the exercise
of the power of su pension upon the Legislative department, to
which only the power wa confided, and it was so effected a to
exclude all po sibility of implication that any such authority was
intended to be conferred upon any other branch of the GoYernment. Looking, then, to the history nind position of the clause,
it is clear that the restriction i applicable to Congress, and that
necessarily involves the premi e that they alone are inYe ted
with the power of su pension.
VIEWED I

THE LIGHT OF AUTHORITY.

Another light in which the pamphlet Yiew this question 1s
that of authority,-the language is this:
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"The question of the power of Congress over this matter has
never been decided authoritatively, and it has never been
"argued with any care, or perhaps argued at all, by a court or
"by counsel in court. So far as authority goe it is a question
" of first impre sion. 'fhere probably has been and still is
" strong profe sional bias in favor of the power of Congress,
"perhaps a judicial bias, if that be possible. It was not easy
"to avoid the bias under the influence of English analogy, which
" some preceding remarks were intended to disqualify; but
"there is nothing on the point that is judicially authoritative."
(Pamphlet, p. 36.)
It then proceeds, in the most summary manner, to brush
away the opinion of Chief Justice Taney in the Merriman case.
Leaving the opinion of the Chief Justice to stand upon its
own merits, it is propose<l. to inquire how far it i true that
there is nothing on the point that i judicially authoritative."
In Ex parte Bollman and Swartwout, 4 Cranch, 101, Chief J ustice Marshall holds this language, "If at any time the public
"safety should require the suspension of the powers vested by
"this act in the courts of the nited State , it is for the Legis" lature to say so.
"That question depend on political con iderations on which
"the Legi lature is to decide. Until the legislative will be
"expressed, this Court can only see its duty, and must obey
" the laws."
This is certainly the very highest judicial authority. But, it
is said, that this was "altogether obiter," and is no authority.
It is worthy of consideration whether even an "obiter" of
Chief Ju tice Mar hall upon such a question would not be good
authority. He spoke neither lightly nor loosely. A review of
the ca ·e will show that he could not have spoken without reflection.
In the latter part of 180G, Burr's conspiracy reached its culmination. Gen. Wilkinson, with a view of strangling it in its
early stage , had arrested certain persons in New Orleans as
emi saries of Burr and accomplices in his treason. Two of
them, Bollman and Swartwout, were sent by him to Washington City under arrest. On the 22d of January, 1807, l\fr. Jefferson, then President, sent a message to Congress detailing the
c;
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facts. On the 23d of January a bill wa passed by the Senate
suspending the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus for three
months in cases of persons charged with treason, or other high
crime or mi demeanor endangering the peace, safety, or neutrality of the United States, who had been or should be arre ted
or impri oned by virtue of any warrant or authority of the President of the United States, or from any person acting under
the direction or authority of the President.
On the 2Gth of January the bill was communicated by the
Senate to the House.
A motion was made by Mr. Eppes to reject it,-the purport
of this motion being that the bill was so infamous as not to be
worthy of consideration. Thi was warmly and ably di cu, eel,
and, upon the vote being taken on the question, "Shall the bill
be rejected?" the vote was-yeas, 113; nays, 19. (Benton's
Debates, Vol. III, p. 515.)
A reference to the e debates will how hat the subject was
thoroughly examined. It wa discussecl a to the power of Congress under the Habeas Corpus clause-the proper con truction
of that clause-the right of the Pre ident to can, e person to
be arre ted in one di trict and tran ported to another,-the subordination of the military to the civil power, ancl the propriety
of endeavoring to protect tho e who had made the arre ...,t from
civil liability therefor, by an act of Congress legalizing what
had been done.
In February, 1807, the motion was made in the upreme
Court of the United States, at Wahington City, for the Habeas
Corpu in the cases of Bollman and wartwout.
pon this
motion a mo t elaborate argument was had upon the power and
jurisdiction of the Court to i sue the writ. Upon the 13th of
February the motion wa. granted, and the opinion of the Court
wa delivered by Chief Ju tice Mar hall. It was in the closing
part of hi remark , and a a conclu ive an wer to all the
objections made to the i ·sue of the writ, that the Chief Justice
uttered the language cited, ante, p. 20.
It is quite evident, from what foll from John on, Justice, in
his di senting opinion upon the motion, that the character of the
transaction, as it related to the action of the Executive Elicl not
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escape the attention of counsel, and it is almost certain that it
wa strongly pressed upon the Court in their speeche .
Ile ays, in referring to the ca e of Burford, "I did not then
"comment at large on the rea on which influenced my opinion,
·• and the cau e wa thi : the gentleman ·who argued that cause
' confined himself strictly to tho e con iderations which ought
"alone to influence the decisions of this Court.
o popular
'ob ervations on the nece , ity of protecting the citizen from
•' Executive oppre sion; ~o animatecl add re s, calculated to enli t
"the pa ions or prejudices of an audience in defence of his
"motion, irnpo ed on me the nece sity of vindicating my opinion."
(Ex parte Bollman & Swartwout, 4th Crnnch, p. lOG.)
The e remarks could haYe reference only to the manner in
which counsel had pres ed the illegal and unauthorized action
of the Executive tlepartment in the matter of the arre ts. It
is proper to remark that hi dis ·ent was imply predicated upon
the want of power in the Court itting as the uprcme Court to
is ' uc writs of Ilabea Corpu . Ile did not deny the power to
the jmlge when holding the Circuit Courts. The ·writ being
i ued and return made to it, a thorough <li cu ion was again
had upon the que tion ,rhether the pri ·oners were lawfully detained or not. On the 21st of February they were discharged,
the Chief Justice again delivering the opinion of the Court.
The di cu sion in Congre s, the pa.. , sage by the Senate of a
bill, the object of which wa to legalize the arre t and transportation of Bollman ancl wartwout, and the elaborate argument
of coun el, the importance of the questions involved, and the
anxiety of the friends of the Executive to obtain legal justification for what had been clone, forbid the supposition that so
important an aspect of the matter did not present it elf as that
of the department in which the power of suspension was repo ed.
Had the Court decided that the power of su pension under
the Con titution re, idecl in the Executive, then, according to
~Ir. Binney's argument, the question could ca ·ily have been
ettled, an<l the Pre ident would have been relieved from the
neces ity of re orting to such indirection as an Act of Congress
for legal ju tification.
For 1st. The Pre ·ident coulcl have decided that Burr's conIn fact, Mr. Bidwell, in his
piracy was in urrection.
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speech, says he had done so. "The first inquiry would naturally
"turn upon the existence of a rebellion. On that point he had
"no doubt. . . . . . . The public notoriety of the fact was,
"perhaps, sufficient evidence for the Lcgi ·lature to act upon, if
"nece ary; but they had also the official statement of the
"Pre ident to that effect."
(Benton's Debate , Vol. III,
p. 510.)
2d. The President had only to decide that the public safety
required the su ·pension, and he and his friends would have
been fully protected.
To suppose that this point could have e caped Mr. Jefferson
and his friend , if there had been a shadow of foundation for
it, is to impute to them a degree of dulness not often met with
in advocate of Executive power.
The fact is, that all parties then concurred in the opinion
that the power resided in Congress alone; and it is quite evident, that tho Constitution was most carefully examined as to
the whole ubject.
If the principle now contended for so earnestly had any semblance of authority, it could not have been overlooked, for it
lay at the very threshold of the invc tigation.
The ubject-matter had grown out of arrests by the military
power, and tran portation to a different di trict from that in
which the arrests had been made. The President had adopted
the acts of his officer.
Chief Ju tice Mar hall examined the Constitution in reference
to the ca e before him. Ile found that the power of u pen ion
wa so clearly in Congres , that it needed no argument, and he
imply stated it a a propo ition too plain for doubt. The
examination of the case by any unbia sed mind can arrive at no
other conclu ion. In this view of the matter, the opinion of
Chief Ju tice :Marshall is in the highest degree judicially authoritative.
In John ton v. Duncan et al., 1 Martin Loui iana R., pp.
157-167, the que tion a to the legality of the martial law
e tahli heel by General Jackson in
cw Orlean during the
memorable winter of 1 15, came up before the Judges of the
Supreme Court of Loui iana.
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Judge Martin in delivering his opinion said : "This leads me
" to the examination of the power to suspend the Writ of Habeas
"Corpus, and that which it is said to include, of proclaiming
"martial law as noticed in the Constitution of the United
"States. As in the whole article cited, no mention is made of
"the power of any other branch of the Government but the
"legi lativc, it cannot be said that any of the limitations which
"it contains, extend to any of the other branches. lniquum
" est peri-Jni defacto, id de quo cogitatU?n non est. If, therefore,
"this suspending power exist in the Executive (under whose
"authority it ha been attempted to exercise it) it exi. ts without
"any limitation-then the Pre ident po~ esses without a limita" tion a power which the Legi lature cannot exercise without a
"limitation. Thus he possesses a greater power alone than the
"Hou e of Representatives the Senate and him elf jointly.
"Again, the power of repealing a law and that of suspending
"it (which i a partial repeal) are legislative powers. For
"eodem rnodo, quo quid construitu:r, eodem modo destruitur. As
"every legislative power that may be exercised under the Con" stitution is exclu ively vestrd in Congress, all others are re" tained by the several State . "
Judge Derbigny says: "The Constitution of the United State ,
"in which everything neces ary to the general and individual
"security has been foreseen, doc not provide, that in times of
"public danger, the Executive power shall reign to the exclu" sion of all other . It does not trust into the hands of a dicta" tor the reins of government. The framer of that Charter
"were too ·well aware of the hazard to which they would have
"exposed the fate of the Republic by uch a provision: and had
"they done it, the States would have rejected a Con ·titution
"stained with a clause so threatening to their liberties. In the
"meantime conscious of the necessity of removing all impecli" ments to the exerci e of the Executive power, in cases of re" 1ellion or inva ion, they have permitted Congress to suspend
"the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpu in tho e circum" stance , if the public afety shoul<l. require it. Thus far and
'' no farther goes the Constitution."
The decision of the Court was in accordance with these views.
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This is judicial authority, and certainly it cannot be said that
the question was not before the Court. Did Mr. Binney overlook this case, or does he not regard the decisions of the
Supreme Court of Louisiana of that day as w_o rthy of notice in
the consideration of what is judicial authority?
But with the exception of a very brief and slighting allusion
to Judge Story's remarks in his Commentaries on the Constitution, the pamphlet omits entirely allusion to two classes of
authorities, which are certajnly entitled to weight in the consideration of every question of constitutional jurisprudence.
They are the opinions of text-writers, and the expressions of
statesmen in the public councils, contemporaneously with the
adoption of the Constitution, and since that time.
First, as to the authority of the text-books. Judge Story,
in his Commentaries, says : "Hitherto, no suspension of the
"Writ has been authorized by Congress since the establishment
"of the Constitution. It would seem, as the power is given to
"Congress to suspend the Writ of Habeas Corpus in case of
"rebellion or invasion, that the right to judge whether the
"exigency had risen, must exclusively belong to that body."
(Story's Com., Sec. 1336.)
"The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus sha11 not be
'' suspended (viz. : by Congress), unless when, in cases of
"rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it."
(Note 15, Tucker's Blackstone, Vol. II, p. 134.)
A very excellent work was published by Mr. Hurd, in 1858,
entitled~ "A Treatise on the Right of Personal Liberty, and on
the Writ of Habeas Corpus." It has the merit of being the
only complete text-book on the subject. He says, "Rebellion
"and invasion are eminently matters of national concern; and
"charged as Congress is, with the duty of preserving the
"United States from both these evils, it is fit tha,t it should
"possess the power to make effectual such measures as it may
"deem expedient to adopt for their suppression.
"In the discha.rge of this duty, it may provide for th~ arrest
"and imprisonment of offenders or of suspected persons, and
"forbid their release, while the exigency lasts, by either
"State or Federal Courts. . . . . . This power has never been
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" exercised by Congress." (Ilurd on Habeas Corpus, pages
133, 134.)
"This clause provides for the suspension of the Writ of
"Habeas Corpus only in cases of rebellion or invasion, when
"the public safety requires it; but Congress has never sus" pended the Writ since the Constitution went into operation."
(The Constitutional Text-book, by Furman Sheppard, published in 1856, p. 143.)
The e are the opinions of eminent lawyers, and one of them
a most distinguished Judge, given at a time when they were
certainly free from any political bias. They are valuable, not
merely for that reason, but al o because they are the concurrence of the minds of impartial commentators, looking at the
question with no other motive than to search for truth, and they
evidence the fact that no other view had ever been taken prior
to the pre cnt day.
But there is a current of authority found in the opinions
expres ed by the tatesmen of the day when the Constitution
wa au.opted, anu running down through the history of the
Government to within a very recent period, which is, perhaps,
more potential than any other.
In the l\fassachu etts Convention, called to determine whether
the Constitution should be ratified or not, the Habeas Corpus
clau e being under consideration on the 26th of January,
1788, "Dr. Taylor a ked why this darling privilege was not
"expre sed in the same manner as in the Constitution of Massa" chu ett ? . . . Ile remarked on the difference of expression,
"and a ked why the time was not limited?
"Judge Dana aid: The answer in part to the honorable gen" tleman must be that the same men did not make both Consti" tutions; that he did not see the nece sity or great benefit of
"limiting the time, supposing it had been as in our Constitution,
"' not exceeding twelve months;' yet, as our Legislature can,
"so might Congress continue the . u pension of the Writ from
"year to year. The safe t and best re triction, therefore,
"ari e from the nature of the cases in which Oong1·ess are
"authorized to exerci e that power at all, namely, in those of
"rebellion or inrn ion. These are clear and certain terms, facts
"of public notoriety; and whenever these shall cease to exist,
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"the suspension of the Writ mu t necessarily cease also. He
"thought the citizen had a better security for his privilege of
"the Writ of Habeas Corpus under the Federal than under
"the State Constitution; for our Legislature may suspend the
"Writ as often as they judge 'the most urgent and pressing
"occasions' call for it.
"Judge Sumner said, that this was a restriction on Congress
" that the Writ of Habeas Corpus houlcl not be su pended,
"except in cases of rebellion or inYasion. The learned Judge
"then explained the nature of the Writ . . . . . The privilege,
"he said, is es ential to freedom, and, therefore, the power to
"suspend it is restricted. On the other hand, the State, he
"said, might be in volvecl in clanger; the worst enemy may lay
"plans to destroy u , and o artfully as to prevent any evidence
"against him, and might ruin the country, without the power
"to suspend the Writ was thus given. 'Congress have only
"' power to su pend the privilege to persons committed by
"' their authority. A person committed under the authority of
"' the States will still have a right to the Writ.'" (2d Elliott's
Debates, 108.)
In the act of ratification by the Convention of New York is
this remarkable clause, among others, explanatory of their understanding of the Con titution: "That every person restrained of
"his liberty is entitled to an inquiry into the lawfulness of such
"restraint, and to a removal thereof, if unla1yful; and that uch
"inquiry and remoYal ought not to be denied or delayed, except
"when, on account of public danger, the Congress shall suspend
"the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.*
"Under these impressions, and declaring that the rights afore" said cannot be abridged or violated, and that the explanations
" afore said are consistent with the said Constitution,
" we, the said delegates, in the name and on behalf of the people
" of the State of ew York, do by these pre ents a sent to and
"ratify the said Constitution." ( upplemcnt to Journal of the

* o proof can be more conclusive than this is as to the understanding
and intention of the framers of the Constitution. This action of the Convention is in itself a complete answer to the elaborate argument under consideration. l' o ingenuity can mystify it. No controversial skill can weaken or
destroy its force.
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Federal Convention, published in Boston in 1819, pp. 428 and
431.)
The Convention of Rhode Island also ratified the Constitution
with certain explanatory declarations; among them is the following:
"VII. That all power of suspending laws, or the execution
" of laws, by any authority, without the consent of the repre" sentatives of the people in the Legisla.ture, is injurious to their
"rights, and ought not to be exercised." (Idem, p. 455.)
In the debate in the Virginia Convention, Mr. Patrick Henry,
in speaking of the 9th section, used this language :
"The design of the negative expressions in this section is to
"prescribe limits beyond which the powers of Congress shall
"not go. .
. . The first prohibition is, that the
"privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended,
"but when, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety
"may require it. It results clearly that, if it had not said so,
"they could suspend it in all cases whatsoever." .
(Elliot's Deb., Vol. III, p. 461.) See also remarks of Gov.
Randolph, quoted ante, p. 9.
These were the declarations in four Conventions called for the
ratification of the Constitution; and in that of New York, it will
be obRerved, that it is expressly set forth, in their act of ratification, that the power of suspension is in Congress.
Mr. Hamilton was a member of the Federal Convention, and
also of the New York Convention. It will scarcely be alleged
that his jealousy of the Executive would have led him so far
astray as thus to have sanctioned the declaration of the existence
of power in Congress, which he, as a delegate to the Federal
Convention, and a member of the Committee on Style and Arrangement, had vested in the President. Can it be said at this
late day to citizens of New York that the power is in the President, when their act of ratification declares it to be in Congress,
and they accepted, adopted, and have acted upon the Constitution with that construction, and without a voice anywhere dissenting from that interpretation, either then or for seventy years
afterwards ?
But passing down in the history of the Government we find
the same views entertained, acted upon, and expressed by public
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men under circumstances which entitle them to very great
weight.
The subject of the suspension of the Habeas Corpus was first
di cus eel in Congress in 1807, when a bill for that purpose was
introduced and passed by the Senate, but rejected by the House.
This has already been referred to; but the opinions then expressed as to the department in which the power was reposed,
have a direct bearing upon the question of authority.
Mr. Jefferson was President, and the history of the transaction furnishes conclusive evidence that he did not, for a moment,
claim the power as existing in his department, but conceded it
to belong to the legi lative.
Timothy Pickering, John Quincy Adams, and William B.
Giles, were members of the Senate. Their names are mentioned
as rlistinguished state~men of their day. The Senate passed the
bill entitled, "An Act to Suspend the Privilege of the Writ of
" Habeas Corpus for a Limited Time in Certain Cases." It
appears to have been a unanimous vote. The bill was reported
by a committee composed of Messrs. Giles, Adams, and Smith
of Maryland. (3d vol. Benton's Deb., 490.)
It is to be inferred that the President and the Senators
from all the States concurred in this con truction. The bill was
sent from the Senate to the House of Representatives, and,
although rejected by them, it was not for a moment doubted
that the power of suspension, upon the occasions contemplated
by the Constitution, appertained exclusively to the Legislative
department. This is sustained by the following quotations from
the speeches delivered in the House:
l\fr. Burwell said, "If that be the case, upon what ground
"shall we suspend the Writ of Habeas Corpus? .
"Nothing but the most imperious necessity would excuse us in
" confiding to the Executive, or any person under him, the power
" of seizing and confining a citizen, upon bare suspicion, for
"three months, without responsibility for the abuse of such
" unlimited discretion."
. . . . .
Mr. Elliott said, "We can suspend the Writ of Habeas Corpus
"only in a case of extreme emergency. . .
"But we hall be told that the Constitution has contemplated
" cases of this kind, and, in reference to them, invested us with
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"unlimited discretion. When any gentleman ~hall achanco such
" a position, we shall meet him upon that ground, and put the
" point at i ue."
Mr. Eppes said, "By this bill we arc called on to exercise one
"of the most important powers vested in Congress by the ConThe words
" stitution of the United States.
"of the Constitution arc, 'The privilege of the Writ of Habeas
" Corpus hall not be suspended, unle'"s when, in cases of rebel" lion or inrnsion, the public safety may require it.' The word" ing of thi clause of the Constitution de. ervcs peculiar atten" tion. It is not in every case of i1wasion, nor in every case of
"rebellion, that the exercise of this· power by Congre s can be
"ju tified under the word of the Con ·titution.
" The Con titut:on, however, having ve ted this power in Con" gre , and a branch of the Lcgi lature having thought its
" exercise necessary, it remain for u to inquire, whether the
"present situation of our country authorizes, on our part, a
" re ort to thi extraordinary measure."
Mr. Varnum said, "I con ider the country, in a clcgree, in
"a ·tate of insecurity; and if so, the power is vested in Con" gre. ., under the Constitution, to su pend tho Writ .of Habeas
'' Corpu ."
Mr. Sloan saicl, "Had this measure been brought forward a
"month or six week ago, I shoultl have votecl for it." .
:Mr. Bidwell Raid, "Before tho pas ing of any bill of thi
"nature, the Ilou~e ought to hai-o sati factory proof that a
"rebellion in fact existed (for there wa. no pretence of an inva" sion), and that the public safety required a su pension of the
"privilege of Habeas Corpus. By the terms of the Constitu" tion, both of these prerequisites must concur to authorize the
" mea ure."
Mr. J. Randolph said, "It appears to my mind like an oblique
" attempt to cover a certain departure from the establi heel law
" of the land, and a certain violation of the Constitution of the
"United State , which, we are told, have been committed. in this
"country. Sir, recollect that Congress met on the first of
'' December, that the President had information of the incipient
"stage of thi con piracy about the last of September, that the
" proclamation i sued before Congress met, and yet that no sug-

31
" O'eRtion either from the Executive or from either branch of
"the Legislature, has tran,_pired touching the propriety of su " pending the Writ of Habea Corpus, until this violation has
"taken place. I will never agree in thi' sideway, to cover up
" uch a violation, by a proceeding highly dangerous to the
"liberty of the country, or to agree that this invaluable privi" lege , hall be suspended, because it has been already violated,
" and suspended too, after the cause, if any there wa , for it has
" cea. ed to exist." .
:\fr. milie said, "A suspension of the privilege of the Writ
"of Habeas Corpu is, in all re pects, equivalent to repealing
"that e ential part of the Con titution which ecurc that prin" ciple which has been callerl the palladium of 'per onal liberty.'
"If we recur to England, we ha11 find that the Writ of Habeas
" Corpus in that country ha been frequently u pcndecl. But
"under what circumstances?
"\Ye have
"taken from the statute of thi country (England) this mo t
"valuable part of our Con titution. The Convention who framed
'' that in trument, believing that there might be cases when it
" would be necessary to ve t a discretionary power in the Exe" cutive, have constituted the Legi lature the judges of this
"ncce. sity; and the only quc. tion to be determined now is,
"docs thi neces ity cxi t ?" (3d rn1. Benton's Deb., 50-1-514.)
On the 17th of February, 1 07 the Hou e of Representative~
proceeded to con ider the motion of Mr. Broom, to wit: "Re,, olved, that it i expedient to make further provi ·ion by law
" for ecuring the privilege of the Writ of Ilabea Corpus to
"per .. ons in cu tocly, under or by color of the authority of the
" United Sta.tes."
:Mr. Broom said, "Thi privilege of the Writ of Habeas
" Corpus has been deemed so important that by the ninth sec" tion of the first Article of the Constitution it is declared that
" it ' hall not be uspendcd, unles w·hen, in ca e of rebcl1ion
" ' or inrn ion, the public safety may require it.' Such i the
"value of thi privileO'e that even the highe t lcgi. lative body
"of the Union-the legitimate representative of the nation" are not intru ted with the guardianship of it, or suffered to
"lay their hands upon it, unle s when, in ca es of extreme
"danger, the public afety sha.11 make it neces ary.
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" This constitutional prov1s1on was intended only as a check
"upon the power of Congress in abridging the privilege, but
"was never intended to prevent them from intrenching it around
"with sound and wholesome la,ws; on the contrary, it was ex" pected that Congress were prohibited from impairing at their
"pleasure this privilege,-that they would regard it as of high
"importance, and, by coercive laws, insure its operation." . .
Mr. Bidwell said, "The Constitution, by restricting tho Legis" lature from suspending it, except when, in cases of rebellion
" or invasion, the public safety may require a suspension, had
"recognized it as a writ of right, and our statutes had autho" rized certain courts and magi trates to grant it."
Mr. G. W. Campbell said, "This p1·ovision evidently relates
"to Congress, and was intended to prevent that body from sus" pending by law the Writ of Habeas Corpus, except in the
" ca cs stated, and has no relation whatever to the act of an
"individual in refusing to obey the Writ,-such refusal or dis" obedience would not certainly suspend the privilege of that
"Writ, and must be considered in the same point of view as the
" violation of any other public law made to protect the liberty
"of the citizen."
• . . .
Mr. Ilolland said, "But, sir, so far as respects the Habeas
" Corpus, the suspension of it applies to tlie Legislature, and not
" to per on . The Constitution says, it shall not be suspended
"but in case of rebellion, or when the public safety requires it.
" This prohibition rnanifestly applies to the Legislature, and not
" to per on in their individual capacity."
Mr. J. Randolph said, '' The Writ of Habeas Corpus is the
" only Writ sanctioned by the Constitution. It i's gu,arded from
"every approach, except by the two Houses of Congress." (3d
vol. Benton's Debate., pp. 520-540.)
In 1842, in the debate on the bill to indemnify Gen. Jackson
for the fine imposed on him by Judge llall, at New Orleans,
Mr. Bayard said, "Congress may indeed suspend the privilege
"of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, but cannot declare martial law
"to be the law of the United States, or of any part of them.
"
. The Constitution says, Congress shall have
"power to declare war, to raise armie , to provide a navy, to
" provide arms and munitions of war, and to make rules for the
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"government of the land and naval forces. On these limited
"and pccific powers it has been inferred that Congre may
"declare martial law. To avoid this very conclu ion there is
" an expre s provi ion in the very next section, among the re" strictions on the powers of Congres , declaring that the remerly
" of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unlc s
"in cases of rebellion or inva ion. .
. All Congres
" can do, even in cases of rebellion or invasion, i to su pend
"the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus; and that can be
"clone by Congress only-not by an officer of the Government" without its authority." (Vol. XIV, Benton's Debate , page

G27.)

On January H, 1843, the same subject wa di cus ·eel in the
House of Repre cntativcs.
Ur. Hunt said (after quoting the ninth section of the first
Article of the Con~titution, which provides that the privilege of
the Writ of Habeas Corpu shall not be su ·pen,led, unle when,
in case of rebellion or inva ion, the public afety may require
it), "Who was to be the jmlge of that necc sity? Was it the
"President of the United States, or any subordinate officer in
"command? No; it ·was the Legislature of the country that
"was the judcre, and the only judge of that necessity. He
"supported the po. it ion by citing the practice of l\Ir. J cfferson,
"who, in 1807, a· President" of the United States, appliecl to
" Congress for a temporary suspension of the ,Yrit of Habeas
" Corpus for three month · ; which, however, was refused by the
"House of Representatives, where the bill was defeated, which
"had pa ed the Senate for that purpose."
In the House of Reprc entatives, in the debate on the bill to
indemnify General Jackson, January 2, 1 44, :Jir. Barnard
sai<l, "The Constitution gave Congre ·s authority to pa s law
"for the regulation of the army and navy of the United State ,
"and under that, Congre have pas...,ed laws for the government
"of the army and navy and the militia. That code was appli" cable to the officers ancl olcliers, and to the militia, when in
"service; but it was not applicable to any other human being.
"Congre it elf coulcl not proclaim martial law. It rn:igltt sus"pend tlie Ilabeas Corpus Act, but it could not suspend the
"Con titution. A proclamation of martial law by the Congress
3
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"of the United States would, of itself, be a violation of the
"Constitution." (Vol. XIV, Benton's Debate.;, p. 657.)
In an opinion delivered by Mr. Attorney-General Cushing,
upon the subject of martial law, and the suspension of the
Habeas Corpu , in February, 1857, growing out of a proclamation of martial law by the Governor of Washington Territory,
in order to su pend the Habeas Corpus, this language is used :
"The opinion is expressed by commentators on the Constitution,
"that the right to uspend the Writ of Habeas Corpus, and
"al o that of judging when the exigency has arisen, belongs
"exclu ively to Congress . . . . . . . It may be assumed, as a
"general doctrine of constitutional jurisprudence in all the
"United States, that the power to suspend laws, whether those
"granting the Writ of Habeas Corpus, or any other, is vested
"exclusively in the Legislature of the particular State."
(Opinions of Attorneys-General, Vol. VIII, p. 365.)
It is a question well worthy of consideration, whether, after
so long and continuous a stream of authority has been flowing
in this one direction, it can be necessary to go into any other
argument to prove this power to be vested in the Legislative
department. If the framers of the Constitution so understood
and intended it, that is an end to the controversy. That they
did o understand and intend is abunda11t1y sustained by the
history of the clause and the authorities herein cited.
It would be a most remarkable instance of inaccuracy, if they
had used language which misled themselves and all other persons who examined the subject for a period of seventy years.
Such weight of authority would, in reference to almost any
other subject, have closed the door to question or doubt forever.
I. the statement "that so far as authority goes it is a question
"of first impre ion," borne out by the facts? It is true that
this remark has reference only to judicial authority. But this,
with the absence of any allusion to the proceedings of the conventions and of Congress, or the text-writers hereinbefore cited,
except a very slighting reference to Judge Story's Commenaries, would lead the reader who bad not examined the subject
o infer that there was no aid to be bad from the records of the
past, whereas a flood of light is poured in by authorities quite
as persuasive and conclusive as any judicial opinions could be,
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however well con idered. It would certainly have been more
sati factory to have had some explanation of these authorities
in connection with the statement referred to, and before it was
made.
In view of the authorities it is now affirmed, that so far from
its being a question of first impres ion, it is in truth most clearly
settled, and should be set at rest for all time.
DOES THE CONSTITUTION, BY ITS OWN TERMS, VEST THE
POWER I THE PRESIDE T?

Having disposed of the question of authority, the pamphlet
proceeds to show that the Constitution, by its own terms, vests
the power in the President. The propositions advanced may be
stated thus:
1. That what the Constitution has ordained on this subject is
all the law required for bringing it into operation.
2. The Constitution itself authorizes its suspension under
conditions, and, therefore, suspension in the cases supposed is
an Executive act, and it never can become anything but an
ExecutiYe act; hence, Congre s could not authorize it.
3. That the conditions of rebellion and invasion, and the
demands of the public safety in such a conjuncture, are within
the proper functions of the Executive department ; that the
Presjdent may establish them, and the power of denying the
privilege for a season belongs wholly to his office, with the effect
which the Constitution allows.
1. As to whether that which the Constitution has ordained is
all the law required for bringing it into operation.
Suspension, practically, must be worked out somewhat in this
manner. A man is arrested, charged with a crime; he applies
to a State or Federal Court for a Habeas Corpus; the Court
to which the application is made, finding that there is no law
suspending the Habeas Corpus, grant the Writ; all officers,
civil and military, are bound to obey it. It is a matter of everyday practice to release minor from the army by this Writ.
Upon the issue of the Writ, and the return showing that the
applicant is confined without a lawful ground of detention, the
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Court is bound to order his discharge, and the officer is bound
to yield obedience. On the contrary, if an act of suspension
had been passed by Congress, the Court would examine the petition, and if the case appeared to be one of those in which the
act was intended to operate, the Judge would refuse to grant the
Writ. If, however, there should be a doubt about it, or for
any reason the Court should have granted the Writ, when the
return to it was made, and it appeared by the return that the
Writ was improvidently issued, as being in contravention of the
law of Congress, the Court would merely so decide, and remand
the prisoner.
By reason of the Act of Congress, the confinement and detention would become lawful as regarded such persons as were
within the purview of the Act, and the Courts would be bound
so to decide, and deny the Writ in the first instance; or if they
had issued it, they would refuse to discharge upon being informed
by the return that the prisoner was held under the provisions of
the act of suspension. This rule would preva.il for so long a
period as the conditions contemplated by the act continued to
exist.
That would be the regular, as well as the most appropriate
method of working out the suspension in all such places as the
Courts were holding their sessions, free from mob or revolutionary violence and influence. This would be "denying,"
"deferring," "delaying," hanging up for such season as was
provided by the act of Congress, in accordance with the -Constitution.
When the courts could not sit, or for any reason, the officers
who had custody of such prisoners were persuaded that harm
would befall the Government by reason of their obedience to
the Writ, if issued by a court, the act of Congress might authorize them to detain the persons so arrested for such length of
time as the public exigency demanded, or to refuse even to obey
the court in the making of any order in violation of the law.
This would be another mode of working out the suspension.
But in either mode there must be a law, an act of Congress,
as a rule of action both for the courts and the officers who may
have custody of the arrested persons. They cannot take the ipse
dixit of any one. Officers cannot detain a prisoner without
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authority of law in any case. Certainly it will not be pretended
that each marshal, or jailer, or military officer, who may have a
prisoner in custody, has the right, under the Constitution, to
determine whether there is rebellion and invasion, and whether
or not the public safety requires the Ila boas Corpus to be suspended by him in the particular case. The confusion resulting
from uch a system i too evident to :1llow of any such interpretation.
Again, if the constitutional clause is all the law required. for
brinaing it into operation, is it not then a law which all men
are alike bound to obey and fulfil,-the President, the jU<lges,
the mar hals, the jailers, the military officers, and all others?
In that a pect of the matter the question becomes a judicial one.
The judges, when applied to for a Habeas Corpus, would have
to inquire: 1. Whether there was a rebellion or invasion. 2.
If they decided that either existed, they would have to inquire
whether the public safety required the suspension or not. No
officer can refuse to obey a lawful writ of a court; and, until
an act of Congress is passed taking away the power from the
courts to is ue and enforce obedience to their authorized writs,
all men must obey. When the writ was issued, and the prisoner
brought into court, it would be purely a judicial question whether
the case fell within the contemplation of the clause or not. The
officer who held the prisoner in custody could not decide the
question for the court.
"Our Constitution, on the contrary, speaks to all subordinate
"authorities created by it.
. The Con titution is
"itself the authority, and all that remains is to execute it in
" the conditioned case." (Pamphlet, page 21.)
Who are the "subordinate authorities'' thus spoken to? And
what is the conditioned case? Are they not the judges, the
President, the marshals, and all other officers, civil and military? I not the conditioned case given by the Constitution?
The argument proves too much. It make suspension the actiYe
operatiYe law in the conditioned case, and of course renders it
a judicial que tion, whether the case has arisen or not, that will
not be contended for by any one.
The foregoing remarks are intended to show that an act of
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Congress is necessary to bring into operation the principle of
suspension provided for by the Constitution.
2. Is suspension, under the Constitution, an Executive act,
and can it become nothing else than an Executive act?
It has already been contended, with what success the reader
must determine, that if the question was left under the constitutional clause without an act of Congress, the suspension would
really be a judicial, not an Executive act; or, if not solely judicial, it would be an act of the marshals, jailers, and other officers
who happened to have the custody of the arrested persons, conjointly with the courts. In point of fact it would not and could
not become an act of the President. He has no direct or immediate custody or control over the penons arrested under the
law in reference to treason. They are in the custody of the
law. They are to be held under the law, tried under the law,
and punished or discharged under the law. He, as commanderin-chief of the army and navy, has prisoners of war under his
control. This is by the law of nations and of war. But not
so with persons who are not such prisoners. A man arrested
for treason, or treasonable practices, is no more under the control or in the custody of the President than such as are detained
for counterfeiting or robbing the mails, or any other crime of
like character. Therefore, when a Writ of Habeas Corpus is
issued by a court to a marshal or jailer, commanding him to
bring before the court a prisoner, and the marshal or jailer
refuses so to do, it is not the President who refuses to obey the
writ, and thereby suspends the privilege, either personally or
acting through the subordinate officer.
The act of suspension consists in the refusal to ~obey. That
is simply and exclusively the act of the officer, and he is liable
personally for all the consequences. The President is in no
sense responsible for it, and his order is no protection to the
officer.
It is unreasonable to say that an act which is to be performed
by an officer of the law, who is to look to the law, and not to
the President, for his rule of action, and who in his sphere is as
independent of the President as the President is of him in the
discharge of his duties, is an act of the President, and cannot
be anything else.
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It is assumed that when Mr. Binney uses the word "Executive" he means "President," and treats the terms as convertible.
If, however, a distinction is to be drawn between "President"
and "Executive," meaning by the first to designate the individual chief magistrate, and by the latter all executive officers of
the Government who derive their appointment from the President, and whose duty it is to aid in the execution of the laws as
well as the President, then the argument which has already been
advanced as to suspension by them under the rule proposed recurs
in full force.
It is not doubted that Congress might (and it would be in the
highest degree proper), in the suspension act, impose certain
duties upon the Pre ident, and invest him with certain discretionary powers as to time, place, classes of persons, and other
circumstances connected with the su pension; but it is not less
clear that they could in like manner confer similar powers and
impose similar duties upon other officers, both civil and military,
for the purpose of ca,rrying the act into effect. Indeed it would
be absolutely nece sary that they should clearly define the duties
of such officers in the premises, in order to protect them from
liability for damage in civil actions, to guard the persons
arrested from arbitrary oppression, and efficiently promote the
public safety.
3. But it is contended that the establishment or declaration
of the existence of rebellion and inva ion, and the demands of
the public safety, are within tho proper functions of the Executive department of our Government, and therefore that the
power of suspension belongs to the office of President, with the
effect which the Constitution allows.
The first part of this proposition demands careful examination. The Constitution does not, in expre s terms, confer upon
the Pre ident, or confide to him, the duty of deciding or declaring
when the conditions of rebellion or invasion exist.
or doe it
either expressly, or by implication, deny the power or duty to
Congress.
The language in that instrument which connects him or his
duties directly with either is the provision, "that the President
"shall be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United
" States, and of the militia of the several States when called into

40
" the actual service of the United States." That is when, by
an act of Congress, they are called into actual service, he is
commander. He cannot ca1l into existence a corporal's guard
without the authority of law.
Congress are alone authorized "to declare war," "to raise
and support armies," "to provide and maintain a navy," "to
make rules for the government and regulation of the land and
naval forces," and "to provide for calling forth the militia to
execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel
invasions.''
Under these provisions, it would seem to be fair to infer that
Congress has the power either to decide for themselves or to
vest the discretion of declaring when invasion or rebellion have
occurred, in such officer as they might deem best for the public
interest. This power was, in fact, exercised in the adoption of
the act of 1792. The authority conferred by that act to call out
the militia was to be executed by the President in the case of the
obstruction to the laws, upon being notified of the occurrence by
the Associate Justice or a District Judge of the proper court.
This vrns the first act on the subject, and although passed, as Mr.
Binney says, in "a spasm of jealousy," it was signed and acted
upon by General Washington. It was repealed in 1795, and a
substitute passed, by which the President was authorized to call
out the militia when the laws of the United States were opposed,
or their execution obstructed by combinations too powerful to be
suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by
the powers vested in the marshals.
:Mr. Binney considers the act of 1795 as very potent proof
of the power and duty of the President in this matter, but
points out no reason why the act of 1792 was not q uitc as conclusive as to the power of Congress to vest the discretion in
any other officer, a.nd especially in a United States Judge.
The case of Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheaton, 19, certainly does not
see in the act of 1795 anything more than an authority to the
President to call out the militia when the exigency had arisen,
and it only decides that which is a well-recognized rule of law,
that when a statute provides that an act shall be done by any
person upon his own judgment as to the contingency having
arisen, no one can go behind his decision. Mr. Justice
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Story, in delivering the opinion of the Court, . aid: "The power
"thus confided to the President is, doubtles , of a very high
"and delicate nature . . . . . . If it be a limited power, tho
"question arises, by whom is the exigency to be judged of and
"decided? . . . . . We are all of opinion that tho authority to
"decide whether the exigency has ari en, belongs exclusively to
"the President, and that his decision is conclu ivo upon all
" other persons. . . . . . The law docs not provide for any
"appeal from the judgment of the President. . . . . . When" ever a statute give a discretionary power to any person, to be
" exerci eel by him upon his own opinion of certain facts, it is a
"sound rule of construction that the statute con titutes him the
"sole and exclusive judge of the existence of these facts; and
"in tho present ca e we arc all of opinion that such is the true
"construction of the act of 1795."
Will this be called an " obiter ? " It decide that the power
of tho President to declare tho existence of invasion is derived
from the statute, and as the statide had given him discretionary
power, the exercise of that power was conclusive.
So far a tho action of Congress i concerned, the "voice"
of the act of 1792 wa to the effect that Congress could vest
the power of deciding as to the fact of rebellion in what officer
they saw fit; and the case of Martin v. fott decides, that as
to inrn. ion, the power of the President in this regard springs
from the authorization of tho act of 1795.
It being established that Congre s may either decide for
them elves, or vest the discretion of deciding when rebellion or
invasion exists, in any officer they may deem best for the public
intere t, and there being no exclusive power in the President
under the Constitution so to decide, by virtue of his office, the
argument based upon the assertion of such power in him fall to
the ground. To infer that, because the Pre iclent was authorized
by the act of Oongre ·s of 1795 to declare the existence of
rebellion or invasion, he wa also empowerctl to suspend the
Habeas Corpu under tho Constitution, is to admit that,
becau e the act of 1792 vested the same discretion in a judge,
like po-wer of suspension in the same ca e was given to the
judge. The statement of this propo ition is its own refutation.
Thi matter of the Pre ident's peculiar, inherent, self-supporting constitutional authority to decide upon and declare the
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existence of rebellion or invasion, with the deduction from it, is
therefore out of the case.
The fallacy as to Executive power under this clause has its
ongm in the erroneous assumption that the " clause '' is
enlarging instead of restrictive in its character, and that the
President derives his power from the Constitution to decide or
declare when rebellion or invasion exists. It is not intended to
deny that the President may, when the conditions of rebellion
or invasion have occurred, take such precautionary measures,
based upon the facts as they exist, and subject to the future
action of Congress, as may be demanded by the public safety.
Nothing is either affirmed or denied in reference to the power of
the President in such an emergency, as it does not belong to
the present discusaion.
The position now taken goes no farther than merely to assert
that the power of declaring the existence of rebellion or invasion belongs, constitutionally, to Congress; that they can vest
the discretion of deciding upon the same facts in any officer
they may deem best; and that the power of the President to
declare their existence authoritatively a.nd conclusively, comes
not from the Constitution, but from the act of Congress ; and
hence the error as to his power to suspend the Habeas Corpus,
predicated upon the mistake as to bis authority in regard to the
declaration of the existence of rebellion or invasion, is readily
and easily comprehended.
The proposition that the "clause " is a restriction instead of
a grant of authority, has already been discussed, ante, p. 8-11.
If it is a restriction, not a grant of power, and the power
to suspend is derived to Congress from other parts of the Constitution, and especially from the clause authorizing them to
provide for the suppression of insurrection, and the repelling of
invasion, it is clear that the Habeas Corpus clause is not a law,
self-executive and becoming operative by way of suspension,
when the contemplated conditions exist, but that it ig a prohibition applicable to Congress only, and leaving it to their legislative discretion to uecide whether the contingencies provided for
have arisen or not, and making it their duty to exercise the
remnant of power left in them, upon the occurrence of the
required conditions.
The admission, however, that the clause is a grant of power,
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instead of a restriction, upon that granted elsewhere, does not
materially affect the question of the exclusive right of Congress.
For, if any ellipsis is to be supplied, so as to make the sense
complete, the materials for the addition are to be drawn from
the ordinary rules of construction governing in such cases :
such as analogy, position, context, judicial and contemporaneous,
official and historical construction. Apply these rules, and the
words to be added are, "And then it may be suspended by
" Oongress." So decided is the argument, from position and
context, that no text-writers, or other persons, whether in the
State Conventions, or Congress, or judges, or lawyers, prior to
the year 1861, ever suggested a doubt about it.
It is immaterial, therefore, whether the clause is regarded as
enlarging or restrictive. For, if the latter, it is a qualification
of power granted by a preceding clause to Congress. If the
former, taken in connection with the preceding and succeeding
provisions, it is a grant of power to Congress, limited by certain specific conditions.
THE PARLIAMENTARY DOCTRINE.

A considerable portion of the pamphlet is addressed to what
is called the Parliamentary doctrine. The effort is made to
establish the proposition that the "clause" is a "departure from
"the English Constitution and rule," and that they are thus
set aside, "as a safe analogy in the application of the clause
"finally adopted." This line of argument is adopted, because
it is admitted, that if the analogy of the English Constitution
is applied to ours, it will inevitably carry the power into the
Legislative, to the exclusion of the Executive department.
To determine to what extent it was a departure, an<l how far
it is requisite to look to the English system, in order to arrive
at correct conclusions, it is proper to take a brief notice of the
English principle, as it existed in the mother country, and was
drawn from that source into, and adopted by the Colonies first,
the States afterwards, and finally by the framers of our Constitution.
The English people always maintained a.nd asserted, "that
"no freeman ought to be committed or detained in prison, or
" otherwise restrained by the command of the King, or Privy
" Council, or any other, unless some cause of the commitment,
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"detainer, or restraint be expressed, for which, by law, he ought
"to be committed, detained, or restrained."*
The Writ of Habeas Corpus furnished the remedy against the
violation of this right in England. This was a common law
writ. It sprang from no statute. The struggle of the people
with the Crown for the maintenance and vindication of the principle resulted in its full acknowledgement and establishment by
the Magna Charta during the reign of King John. But it was
necessary to secure the right from c·xecutive encroachment
through servile judges, by some stringent and severe enactments. This gave rise to several acts of Parliament, the more
important of which were the 16 Charles I., 31 Charles II., and,
at a later period, 56 George III. These acts only protected
the people in th8 enjoyment of the common law right, by the
enactment of severe penalties for its violation, or for the refusal
or denial of the Habeas Corpus. They conferred no right not
already existing, but merely guarded and protected more efficiently the remedy. The right itself, and the privilege or right
to the remedy (the Writ of Habeas Corpus), were both common
law rights.t The only qualification of either was also a common

* The general principle seems to have had its advocates long prior to
the English era. About eighteen centuries ago, when Porcius Festus and
King Agrippa were examining the Apostle Paul, v. ho had appealed from the
provincial court to the Roman Emperor, the former said: "It seemeth to me
"unreasonable to send a prisoner, and not withal to signify the crimes laid
"against him." (Acts, Chapter XXV, verse 27.)
t "It is a very common mistake, and that not only among foreigners, but
many from whom some knowledge of our constitutional laws might be expected, to suppose that this statute of Charles II. enlarged in a great degree
our liberties, and forms a sort of epoch in their history; but, though a very beneficial enactment, and eminently remedial in many cases of' illegal imprisonment, it introduced no new principle, nor conferred any right upon the subject.
From the earliest records of the English law, no freeman cou1d be detained in
prison except upon a criminal charge or conviction, or for a civil debt. In the
former case it was always in his power to demand of the Court of King's Bench
a writ of habeas corpus acl s1t~jiciendmn, directed to the person detaining him
in custody, by which he was cnjoiued to bring up the body of the prisoner,
with the warrant of commitment, that the Court might judge of its sufficiency,
and remand the party, admit him to bail, or discharge him, according to the
nature of the charge.
"This writ issued of right, and could not be refused by the Court. It was
not to bestow au immunity from arbitrary imprisonment, which is abundantly
provided in Magna Charta (if indeed it were not much more ancient), that
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law principle, to wit, that Parliament, and Parliament alone,
could uspend the privilege of the Writ, if they cho e so to do,
by tho enactment of a law for that purpose.
Thus stood the Engli h law when the Colonies were founded,
and, in the language of the Continental Congress of 177 4, " Our
" ance ·tors who first settled these Colonies were, at the time of
" their emigration from the mother country, entitled to all the
"rights, liberties, and immunities of free and natural born sub" jects within the realm of England."
Lord Chatham: in his argument before the llouse of Lords
against the doctrine of taxation without representation, in 176G,
said, "The Colonies are equally entitled with yourselves to all
"the natural right of ip.ankind, and the peculiar privileges of
"Engli hmen, equally bound by the law , and equally partici" pating of the Constitution of this free country. The Ameri" cans are the sons, not the bastards of England." These doctrines have been universally recognized throughout the United
States as true.
The principles, as to the freedo~ of the people, -were the
same in the Colonies as in England; al o the principle that the
power of suspen ion of the privilege of the Habeas Corpus was
exclusively vested in the Legislative department, and explicitly
and pointedly denied to tho Executive department, was the law
of the Colonies as well as of the mother country.
When the Colonies threw off their allegiance to Great Britain
the principles of the common law still prevailed, and the powers
which had previously resided in the Parliament became ve ted
the statute of Charles II. was enacted, but to cut off the abuses by which the
Government's lust of power and the servile subtlety of Crown lawyers bad
i•mpaired so fundamental a privilege." (Hallam's Constitutional History, page
500, chapter 13.)
.
"The Habeas C011n1s is a common law writ, and has been used in England
from time immemorial just as it is now. The statute of 31 Car. 2, c. 2, made
no alteration iu the practice of the courts in granting these writs (3 Barn. &
Ald. 420-2; Chitty Reps. 207). It merely provided that the judges in vacation should have the power which the courts had previously exercised in term
tiine (1 Chitty's Gen. Prac. 586), and inflicted penalties upon those who hould
defeat its operation. The common law upon this subject was brought to
America by the colonists; and most, if not all the talcs, have since enacted
laws rcscm bling the English statute of Charles IL in every principal feature."
(Pas more Williamson's case, 2 Casey (Penna. State Reports), p. 16.)
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in the legislative bodies of the respective Colonies, and the
restrictions upon the King fell upon the Executive departments
respectively so far as they were applicable.
Thus the proposition is deduced that, from the time of the
Declaration of Independence, and up to the adoption of the
Constitution of the United States, the right of freemen to the
Habeas Corpus existed in the respective States just as it did in
England; that the Legislative department in each, and it alone
had the power of suspension, having inherited this function with
all others which had belonged to the British Parliament; and
that the non-existence of power in the Executive department
was a part of the organic or fundamental law as it was in England. Of course it is not intended to deny that these principles
might have been modified by State Constitutions.
Such were the general principles when the framers of the
Constitution met together. No one can doubt that they were
legislating with reference to matters as they then stood. They
knew "\\hat the common law of England was, as applied to
King, Parliament, and people, and that it applied to tho Executive departments, Legislative departments, and the people of
the several States, in the same manner as in England, except so
far as the change of circumstances ha.d modified it. In this
regard there was no modification. They incorporated this great
principle of the common law of non-suspension into the Constitution with no change, except to enlarge upon it as drawn from
England, in favor of liberty, by limiting the power of suspension
to occasions "when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public
"safety may require it."
In all other respects, whether as regards the right of freemen or the Writ, or the privilege of the Writ, or the rules and
doctrines applicable to the subject, in its every phase, they were
left as brought from the mother country, and planted in the
Colonies and carried into the new relation of independent States.
Nor is there a single word in the Constitution which modifies, or
alters, or changes the common law principle, that the power of
suspension appertains to the Legislative department.
Mr. Binney says of the clause, "It is un-English, because it
"ties up the legislative power as well as ·an other power; and
" it is American, because it is of American origin, and is a conH servative of personal freedom in general, and also of the public
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" safety, in times of imminent internal danger of a specific cha" racter." Is thi true in point of fact? It is the incorporation of a principle drawn entirely from English constitutional
law, with a limitation or restriction added, which leaves the
English principle in every respect in full force whenever the
conditions exist which authorize the exercise of the power of
suspension.
In other words, the moment the case of rebellion or invasion
intervenes, and the public safety requires it, the restriction disappears, and every principle of the British Constitution springs
into full life and vigor as applicable to this subject. A rebellion exists, and the power of suspension ipso facto is, in every
respect, the English power of suspension.
It is peculiarly English also in this, that while the Parliament
have the power of suspension, it has been usual to exercise it
only when it was deemed best for the public safety, during
foreign and domestic disturbances. Their practice corresponds
with our constitutional restriction.
The only substantial difference, then, between our Constitution
and the English is, that what Parliament may do at any time
the proper department of our Government may do only at certain specified times, and that the restriction is but the enactment of their practice as a part of our organic law. By
their law, asserted and reasserted, established by everything
that can render a fundamental principle inviolably sacred, and
so endeared and cherished as to put the head of any sovereign
in peril who would encroach upon the right of his meanest subject in this respect, the King of England is prohibited from the
unlawful detention of any man, however vile or obscure.
The King is the Executive of England. The framers of the
Constitution were fre h from the struggle of the War of Independence. They had based their justification upon his illegal
and despotic acts. It was Executive power which had oppressed
their forefathers, and which had roused themselves to the highest
pitch of desperation in resistance to its aggressions.
They saw the value of the principle of the Habeas Corpus in
the Engli~h system as a protection against Executive power,
and adopted it with one addition in favor of the liberty of the
people; namely, a re triction of the power of suspension upon
the Legislative department, in which alone it was vested. This
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is the only departure from the English principle. Its extent,
however, can be appreciated when the fact is adverted to that
our constitution upon this subject is but the enactment of their
constitution and practice combined.
Enough has been said to show how utterly impossible it is to
discard English analogy in considering this subject, as also to
test the soundness of the objections to this mode of construction.
The analogy is neither defective nor deceptive. It_is the only
one we have, and is the source whence the principle and everything connected with it have been drawn. We can as readily
discard our language, or ignore our English blood. With it, the
subject is simple and easy of comprehension; without it, we are
lost in a labyrinth of vague and bewildering speculation.
l\Ir. Binney pcesents the matter in another light which
demands notice. On page 35, he says: "If the clause in the
"Constitution had said of the WRIT of Habeas Corpus, or of a
"Habeas Corpus Act, enacted, or to be enacted, what it says of
"the PRIVILEGE of the Writ, there would have been some ground
"for the argument that a Writ of Habeas Corpus and a Habeas
" Corpus Act, being the work of the Legislatu,re, the suspension
"of the Writ or Act should be made by the Legislature also."
This is a statement that the Writ of Habeas CorpU,S and the
Habeas Corpus Acts are both legislativ( in their origin. A
moment's reflection will detect the error conveyed by this language. Habeas Corpus Acts are the work of Legislatures. But
the Writ of Habeas Corpus, as it prevails in the several States,
has not necessarily its foundation in any legislative act, but in
the common law. The legislative acts in reference to it only
secure its benefit or privilege against corrupt or tyrannical
judges, and compel its issue and obeclience to it under severe
penalties. Hence, if the clause had only spoken of the "Writ
of Habeas Corpus," the language would not have been sufficiently
comprehensive, as it might possibly have been held not to apply
to the provisions of legislative acts.
It would have fallen equally short of the mark, if it had
spoken of a Habeas Corpus Act, enacted, or to be enactecl, for
then it might have been held not to apply to the common law
right to the Writ of Habeas Corpus.
.
·
Either form would only have covered half the ground. The
language used expresses most appropriately and accurately the
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restriction intended to be imposed, comprehending alike the
benefit of the Writ under the common law and also under any
legislative act.
Tho Writ of Habeas Corpus has its derivation from three different sources: 1. The common law, which prevails throughout
the several States composing tho Federal Union.* 2. The Habeas Corpus Acts of the several States. 3. The act of Congre s,
authorizing the issue of the Writ.
Both the common law principle and that of all Habeas Corpus
Acts have tho same and but one purpose, and that is, to confer
upon arrested persons the benefit or privilege of the Writ.
Whether that benefit or privilege flows from the common law, or
a Habeas Corpus Act, it is the purpose to be affected-the right
to be secured-the thing to be accompli hed. "Privilege," as
used, is the generic term, comprehending all forms of enjoyment
of the Writ, from whatever source, or in ·whatever manner
derived. It embraces the Writ alike, as derived from the common law, and from legislative acts, whether of Congress, or of
the several States, and is to be taken as if it had spoken
expressly of all of them . Hence, if there is ground for the
argument upon the hypothesis put by Mr. Binney, it will be
seen that it is not weakened by the language which was actually
adopted, but rather, that as in one aspect the enjoyment of the
privilege might flow from or be secured by a legislative enactment, it would require legislation to . uspend it.
TIIE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY.

The pamphlet under con ideration does not rest the claim for .
the power of the President upon either martial law or the doctrine of neces ity. But it is urged by many per ons that unless
this power is Yested in the Executive, the Government might be
destroyed before Congress could be assembled; that there are
occasions when the afety of the nation demands its exercise
by the President.

* It is not intended to state that there is a common law of the United States
in their relation as a Federal Union. But reference is had to the common
law which prevails in each State, as it was imported from England, except in
so far as it has been modified by Federal or tate Constitutions, or statutory
law, or by the altered condition of the people.
4
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Let it be admitted. Is that a reason why the Constitution
should be made to mean what was not intended? It was conceived some months ago, that the safety of the nation required
the increase of the army and navy. There was no act of Congress authorizing it. The President took the responsibility.
Did any one imagine, because the preservation of the Government required it, therefore the President had the constitutional power? It was admitted on all hands he had not, and
his justification was to be found in the subsequent ratification
by Congress.
It will not be denied that there are occasions which seem to
call for extreme measures; when the Executive department may
be strongly pressed to go to the utmost verge of doubtful power.
All that can be said when that power is transcended is, that
what is then done should be viewed with reference to the surrounding circumstances, and if they demonstrate the necessity
and propriety of the course of the President, his acts should
receive kind and generous consideration at the hands of those
whose rights and interests he intended to guard and protect.
But because an act was done of necessity before Congress
could be called together, that does not prove that it should be
continued after Congress has been for weeks or months in session ; nor does it engraft any new principle on tr.e Constitution.
If Congress refuse to do their duty, the fault lies with them,
but the President cannot usurp their powers. If this argument
of the safety of the State is to furnish the rule of action for the
Executive department, then Congress becomes a useless and cumbrous piece of machinery, and the sooner it is dispensed with the
better; but along with it must go the Constitution. That instrument was specially intended to obviate and exclude any such
appeal. It is written law, and was intended to prevent the exercise of arbitrary power in such emergencies as would tempt those
in office to encroach upon the liberties of the people; The Constitution knows no "higher law" than its own plain precepts.
That doctrine was born later down in the life of the nation. It
is an excrescence thrown out in the heat of sectional and
fanatical strife. It is neither Scriptural nor constitutional. It
sweeps away all landmarks, human and Divine, and would
cauy us back into chaos-moral, social, and political.
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But there is no such necessity, and no such dilemma as that
supposed.
Congress can, by general law, provide for suppre sing insurrection, and repelling invasion, when they occur.
They did so in 1795, and again in the extra session of 1861.
The suspension of the Habeas Corpus is clearly one of the
means which may be used constitutionally for that purpose;
and, if they see fit, they can authorize its suspension on such
occasions when the public safety may require it.
Another form of putting this derivation of the claim from
necessity, adopted by some persons, is, that during war, foreign
or insurrectionary, martial law supersedes the civil law.* A
recent writer, in the "North American Review," of October,
1861, defines martial law to be "that military rule and autho" rity which exists in time of war, and is conferred by the laws of
'' war, in.relation to persons and things under and within the scope
"of active military operation· in carrying on the war, and which
"extinguishes or suspends civil rights and the remedies founded
"upon them for the time being, so far as it may appear to be
"necessary, in order to the full accomplishment of the purposes
"of the war." Where that military rule is to be found, in what
code, what are its limits, who is to declare it, and who to repeal
it, are questions that have never yet been answered.
Jacobs's Law Dictionary furnishes this definition: "The law
"of war-that depends upon tho just but arbitrary power and
"pleasure of the King or his lieutenant. He useth absolute
"power, so that his word is law."
In ordinary times the man would be deemed irrational who
affirmed that we are Lable to have any such law imposed
upon us. The power of the President to call out the forces
required to suppress insurrection, or repel invasion, comes from
. the act of Congress. The organization of the army and navy,
the time and manner of their enlistment, the rules and articles
of war for their government, down to the most minute particular,

* A very able pamphlet on the subject of martial law was published by the
Hon. . S. icholas, of Kentucky. in the year 1842. It has been republished
within the past year with some additions, and should be read by every one who
may wish to arrive at a just conclusion upon this subject.
His devotion to the preservation of the Union and the Constitution, and his
eminence as a jurist, alike entitle his voice to be heard and his opinions to be
esteemed by his countrymen.
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a.re provided and enacted by Congress. It is under the authority of laws of Congress that every act is done in the course of
a war. Is the power of the creature paramount that which
created him? A stream cannot rise higher than its source.
The Constitution says, Congress may suspend. the Habeas
Corpus. They create an army to suppress insurrection, but do
not choose to suspend the Habeas Corpus. Can any general,
whether commander-in-chief, or a subordinate, take upon himself to do that which those who brought him into existence did
not authorize ? Yet this is suspending the Habeas Corpus by
martial law. The King of Great Britain cannot proclaim or
establish martial law in his dominions.* Has the President more
unlimited arbitrary power than the King of Great Britain? If
the President can proclaim or establish martial law, what becomes of Articles III., IV., V., and VI., of amendments to the
Constitution? Read them carefully, ante, page 6. They must
first be abrogated before this new dogma can be inaugurate<L t
They were proviJ.ed for the express purpose of fencing in and
restraining any such dangerous and injurious tendencies. No
articles could, perhaps, have been better or more explicitly
framed for the protection of the liberty of the people ; and it
requires but a calm and impartial perusal of the whole Constitution to see that this doctrine of the right of the Executive department to establish martial law has not the shadow of foundation there, but, on the contrary, is repugnant alike to its spirit
and letter.

* Some remarks of Mr. Hargrave, in reference to the power of the King of
Great Britain to proclaim martial law, will be found printed in the Appendix.
They are commended to the careful attention of the reader.
t Many persons, and some of them by no means unlearned in the law, have
recently advanced the proposition that there are occasions when it is justifiable
to violate one part of the Constitution in order to preserve another. There is
an authority to sustain that view to even a greater extent, perhaps, than they
contend for. It is probably due to candor that such an authority should not
be omitted in a discussion upon the suspension of the Habeas Corpus. On
an occasion of the discussion of the suspension of the Habeas Corpus in the
Irish Parliament, that distinguished constitutional jurist, Sir Boyle Roche,
said, "It would surely be better, Mr. Speaker, to give up, not only a part, but,
if necessary, even the whole of our Constitution: to preserve the remainder!"
(Sketches by Sir Jonah Barrington, Judge of the High Court of Admiralty,
Ireland, page 139.)
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GE~ERAL REMARKS.

Recurring to the principles of construction, as applicable to
the "Ifobca Corpus" clause, it will be seen that the claim of
the power of su pension for the Executive department is not
sustained by either the plain rendering of the language or the
spirit of the Constitution; that it is negatived by English
analogy and the common law as it existed in the States at the
time of its adoption; that it is contravened by the history of
the clau e in the Convention, and contemporaneous explanations
of the members of that and the State Conventions, and by the
uniform current of authority to be derived from the expressions
of jurist., text-writers, ancl state men, from the foundation of
the Federal Union down to the year 1861.
It i' none the less clear that the power of suspension is vested
in Congress, and in no other department. They are to exercise
it as any other power conferred by the Constitution ; that is,
by pa sing a law, providing how, when, where, by whom, and
for what length of time the privilege of the Writ is to be suspendecl, an<l a to what persons it shall be applicable. It is their
duty, when doing so, to provide such guards and checks as may
be requisite for the protection of the people against arbitrary
and capricious arrests and detention, and to restrain those who,
clothed with authority, may be disposed to violence or oppression.
othing can be fraught with greater danger to the libertie of the people than subjection to the exercise of unregulated
power of seizure and incarceration by innumerable officers, civil
and military, catterecl over all parts of the country.
It i not to be desired that any authority should be taken
from the Pre. iclent which is given to him by the Constitution.
~I.1he experience of seventy years has demonstrated the wisdom
of the framers in the establishment and organization of the
Executive department. But it has also shown the necessity for
confining each department to the exercise of its own peculiar
and appropriate functions.
Every violation of law, whether moral or governmental, has its
attenrlant evil. The act of to-day becomes a precedent for tomorrow. A deflection from the line of rectitude, however slight
in the fir t instance, involves the danger of still greater dep,~r-
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tures in the future. That which might have been in the highest
degree commendable, if authorized, may afterwards be relied
upon as justifying the gravest and most unpardonable wrongs.
One department of Government transcends its constitutional
powers in what it deems a case of extreme necessity. The
act evokes suspicion, distrust; and j ea,lousy on the part of the
other departments. It loosens the constraining force of the
Constitution on all branches of the Government. The danger
is, that when one ligament is broken, others will become relaxed, and, after a time, they will, one by one, be cut asunder,
until the Constitution ceases to exist, except in name.
But not alone is evil to be apprehended from the violations on
the part of the departments of the Government being thus induced. The people have always been watchful and jealous of the
exercise by their rulers of powers not clearly granted. Each unauthorized act weakens the confidence of the people in their form
of Government. As confidence is withdrawn, respect and affection fade. Prejudice against an act of violation attaches itself
more or less to the officer to whom it is attributed, and, by an
inflexible law of human nature, to the authority under which he
claims his power. When these vicious influences have prevailed
for a sufficient length of time, the people will be ready to yield
to the counsels of evil-minded leaders, who, instead of seeking to
restore the Government to its pristine integrity, by lawful and
peaceable means, bend all their energies to impel their followers
into the vortex of revolution and civil war.
These are some of the evils to be apprehended from any violation of the Constitution; and there is no one feature of it
about which the people are more sensitive than that which relates to personal liberty. It is of the utmost importance that
even a doubtful power should not be exercised in a point so
wounding to their sensibilities.
It is to be most earnestly and devoutly hoped that no future
occasion will arise when any resort to the suspension of the
Habeas Corpus will be deemed requisite by any one. But, if it
should, then, it is trusted, that the members of Congress of the
day will _have the firmness and manliness to meet the question,
and, if necessary, provide such a law as is required by the public
safety and warranted by the Constitution.
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~i PP END IX.
"Ifargrave's Jurisconsult Exercitations," Vol. I., page 399.
Opinion in Irish case involving l\Iartial Law.
The following small article includes, in some degree, matter of very
high importance, which, though of great notoriety in Ireland where
the transaction occurred, is not so generally known among us in England. It relates to the case of l\Ir. Cornelius Grogan, an Irish gentleman of large fortune, in the County of 1Vexford, who, during the
horrid rebellion in that part of Ireland, in 1798, was taken for high
treason, under the circumstance of there having been a previous proclamation authorizing martial law, in aiding the rebels, and was tried by a
Court of Officers, and, being found guilty, was put to death on the judgment of that Court j and was, shortly after his death, attainted of high
treason, by act of the Iri.h Parliament.
"Upon the case thus generally stated, with a view to the trial of rebels
by martial law, it is proper to add that, in 1799, an lribh act of Parliament was pas ed, which, in effect, appears to recognize that it is a part
of the Royal pre1·ogative, during the time of rebel1ion, to authorize the
King's general and other commanding officers to punish rebels according
to rna1"tial law, by death or otherwise, as to them, shall seem expedient.
That an act of Parliament may, for more effectually suppressing rebellion, so extend trial by ma1·tial law, and so also give to generals, and
other commanding officers, a discretion of punishing rebels, found guilty
upon such trial, either with death, or indefinitely hi any other way, is
not to be doubted; for, when such an act is passed, though judges or
others should ever so strongly feel, either its incongruity with the principles of our law, or its harsh latitude otherwise, the act must operate,
till it be revoked by the same high authority as engraft, it on the law
of England. But the question which forced itself, in a great degree, on
the author's mind, when he was called upon professionally to write his
opinion, in answer to those who consulted him for the purpo~e of seeking
a repeal of the Grogan attainder, was,-whether, independently of the
express warrant of an act of Parliament, and on the mere ground of prerogative power, authority could be given against persons taken into custody for hiah
o trea on durin(J'
0 the heat of rebellion, to try them by mar-
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tial law for their offence, and to punish them either by death, or in any
other wny, at the discretion of the court martial so trying them. Lookincr
to that que tion, he could not forbear avowing how his mind was affected.
But he so avowed him elf, under a conviction that martial law to such
an extent was not the law of England, without an expres act of Parliament. He saw the right of putting rebels to death in battle while the
battle lasted. He al o aw the rio-bt to arrest those found in actual rebellion, or duly charged with being traitors, and to have them imprisoned
for trial and punishment according to the law of trea on. But he could
not see that trying and punishing rebels according to martial law was,
when l\Ir. Grogan was tried and put to death, part of the English law,
as it was admini. terable in England, or even as it was admiui terable in
Ireland. On the contrary, he aw such a prerogative doctrine to be
unconsonant with several recitals, and one enactment in that grand act
of Parliament, the petition of right ir: the 16th of Charles the First.
He saw it also to be irreconcilable with the opinions declared by some
of the greatest lawyers of that time to a committee of the whole House
of Commons, sitting on martial law, namely, Sir Edward Cocke, l\Ir.
Moy, afterwards Attorney-General, 1\Ir. Rolle, afterwards Sergeant-atLaw, and author of the "Abridgment," Ir. Banks, afterwards successively Attorney-General and Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas,
and . Ir. l\Iason, distinguished both as a lawyer and a. member of Parliament; for which opinion the author begs leave to refer to the preserntion of them in the Appendix to Rushworth's third volume. Further,
the author found such a latitude of martial law equally crossed by the
doctrines of Lord Chief Ju tice Hale, as expre .. sed in his manuscript
and unprinted collections on the prerogative. This, the author trusts,
will, without for the present looking further, sufficiently at lea t apologize for the strong terms used in those parts of his following opinion in
the Grogan case which relate to martial law, even though volumes of
cruel and irregular practice, during the sad extremities of civil war,
should be laboriou ly collected, to overcome the potency of the petition
of right; and of the high, grave, legal authorities, the author inclusively
relies upon as , peaking the same language."
[Herc follows the opinion, but it is omitted, as not being necessary
for the purposes of this discussion.]

